Looking Forward in Mindanao

Another line of speculation implicates the U.S. It is blamed for wanting to extend its presence in the region. Pointing to a contingent of U.S. Special Forces that has been providing “technical assistance” to the Armed Forces of the Philippines since 2002, some argue that the U.S. seeks to prolong the conflict to facilitate a permanent military presence. Although the U.S. insists the contingent is not there permanently and not engaged in any military operations, reports by civic groups have created a different perception by noting that the group is located in a compound guarded by U.S. soldiers and contractors inside a Philippine military installation and where there is a good deal of construction of what appears to be permanent facilities.

Others have argued that the U.S. actually wants to create a separate state in Mindanao to balance the improving relations between Manila and Beijing. Evidence to support the claim includes the involvement of the U.S. Institute of Peace and Ambassador Kristie Kenney in the peace process and both have publicly acknowledged Bangsamoro grievances in the conflict. The fact that Ambassador Kenney was present in Kuala Lumpur for the aborted signing of the MOA-AD is used as an indication that U.S. interests are not the same as those of the GRP.

Given the retrenchment of positions by both sides and potential for fresh violence in the region, dismissing these perceptions as wrong is a mistake. The U.S. should disband the Special Forces operation in the region or at least open it to scrutiny by all branches of the Philippine government, focus its development assistance efforts into multilateral channels to the extent possible, and ensure that its policies in the region are consistent with those of the Manila government.

The way forward

In fact, any peace settlement in Mindanao will require a serious rethinking of sovereignty in the Philippines and a lot of creative thinking about how to accommodate the interests of all parties. This includes the government of the Philippines, the MILF leadership, the Moro National Liberation Front leadership, traditional Moro chiefs (datus) who still hold power, the indigenous lumad, the Christian settlers, etc. Each of these parties has legitimate interests and grievances that must be addressed. This will require careful consultation with legal and constitutional experts that is transparent – not secret negotiations that exclude a large segment of the population.

Unfortunately, with the loss of confidence in the negotiation process, both sides are more inclined to opt to return to violence than build trust. Therefore, it is imperative that the international community, which has been engaged in economic development and building local capacity to improve governance, must stay the course. The GRP’s strategy of focusing on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration only makes sense in the context of a robust program of development assistance. Rogue MILF soldiers and commanders should be held responsible for their actions; this should be done through mechanisms agreed upon by both sides in the peace talks, not by conducting military offensives. While it is necessary for the MILF leadership to deal decisively with rogue elements, it would be a mistake to conclude that the fresh violence is linked to international terrorism or religious radicalism. The conflict in Mindanao is first and foremost political and only secondarily about religion or economics.

Needed now is a long-term vision and a roadmap at both the national and regional level for integrating the Bangsamoro nation into the Republic of the Philippines. It is incumbent upon the central government to make the necessary constitutional changes to accommodate a broader definition of sovereignty. Local leaders must accommodate the interests of all parties residing in the region. Integration of “first nation” people is not unique to Mindanao. A 2007 study by the U.S. Institute of Peace provides several excellent recommendations on how such a project could be undertaken. Military action, whether it be in the form of counterterrorism or civic action projects, is at best a band-aid approach to the problem. The real need is for post-conflict development along with programs to improve governance and the administration of justice. This will require strong leadership on all sides along with careful compromise and collaboration, not threats of violence and politically motivated secret deals.

Carl Baker (cbakerpf@hawaii.rr.com) is director of programs for Pacific Forum CSIS.