Q&A: Mindanao on the Brink

LINGGA: Several times the MILF leadership said that their commanders in the field are already impatient on the slow progress of the negotiations. The aborted signing of the MOA on ancestral domain triggered the actions of some of these commanders to take military action.

Could this lead to a split in the MILF? I do not see it will go in that direction. On the other hand, the aborted MOA signing strengthens the organizational grip of the MILF leadership, and widens its support among the Bangsamoro masses.

What do you think the international community, particularly those who have plunked in money to Mindanao (the USAid, the EU, Canada, Australia), should do as a result of this? Can they continue to engage the MILF? Should they?

ABUZA: The international donors should condition further aid on the MILF central command exhibiting command and control. Attacks on civilians cannot be tolerated.

CASIPLE: I think it was a mistake from the start to directly engage the MILF for these countries. It only emboldened it to aspire for a separate state (as the BJE promotes) without the responsibility for observing international norms. There are other political groups within the Moro community who do but are not engaged in the war. These should have been the natural groups to deal with for these countries. Remember, any indication of a Moro drive for a separate statehood, considering the mixed population in Mindanao, is a recipe for civil war.

WADI: What happened in North Cotabato, Lanao del Norte and Saranggani is not enough to change the position of the international community, especially funding agencies like USAID, CIDA, JICA and others that have economic interest in Mindanao. Their support on areas under the influence of the MILF remains. In a sense, they understand the feeling of the MILF after the aborted MOA signing in KL, though it does not mean they condone the acts of violence by some of its members. Their primary interest, I think, is for both parties to go back to negotiating table especially after the decision on the MOA by the Supreme Court.

LINGGA: The international community understands that the MILF cannot be faulted for what happened. It patiently negotiated with the government for 11 years, and it had informed them of the impatience of its field commanders. When the product of long negotiations is about to be signed, government backed out.

Aid agencies should have understood that violent confrontation in conflict situation can just recur anytime if negotiations are derailed.

If the intention of aid agencies is to solve the problem with their development projects, I would say it will not work. But if the intention is in support of the peace process then it has to continue and engage the actors in the peace process. If the peace process is dead, then they have to rethink their role in Mindanao.

Is the peace settlement the MILF and the government envision the only option to address the Mindanao problem? What can the Moro people do aside from the peace negotiations to assert their right to self-determination?

CASIPLE: The real way to peace in Mindanao is to address four points: 1) the right of self-determination of the Moro people; 2) the need for pluralism in Mindanao; 3) alleviating Moro poverty and promoting their development; and 4) integrating them in the country’s political and governance system. The obvious framework for these is autonomy — not the autonomy of ARMM (basically controlled from Manila — but a real autonomy with Moro representation from national up to the barangay, wherever they are located. Federalism is not the correct solution in a situation where the drive for a separate Moro state remains alive — it will disadvantage both the Filipino and Moro peoples.

WADI: Peace settlement with the MILF is one of the major keys to address the Mindanao conflict. The other key is the preparation of the government in conducting the peace process. It means Malacanang should have been pro-active in pursuing the peace process as a national agenda so that other branches of government like the Congress and the Judiciary, including the local executives of local government units, could have taken a semblance of coherent positions on peace process. As these other keys are absent, Malacanang now realizes its blunders and pitfalls.

LINGGA: As of now, the MILF is the only group with political and military organizations capable of challenging government. It has also shown its capability to confront government in international diplomacy. If no peace settlement with the MILF will be reached, the probability is the armed conflict will continue, which will be very costly not only in terms of government expenditures but also in terms of death, injuries, displacement of people, and will certainly inflict heavy toll on the economy. As the conflict will be prolonged, secession of the Bangsamoro homeland might become an option to some. (Carlos H. Conde/pinoypress.net)