Q&A: Mindanao on the Brink

LINGGA: The violent incidents that occurred in recent days are reactions to failure of government to sign the MOA on ancestral domain after 11 years and seven months of negotiations. They are also reactions to inflammatory and provocative statements coming from Christian politicians, both local and national, who are opposed to the MOA, calling Christians in the region to arm themselves. With threats of unleashing the Ilaga and other Christian vigilantes against Muslim populations, these triggered some armed groups to take preemptive actions.

Many say the MILF gained some international goodwill and recognition since the MOA came out but it pretty much undid all that because of the Lanao del Norte atrocities. Do you agree with this?

ABUZA: I agree. The peace process of the past 2-3 years has garnered the MILF lots of international goodwill: from the US, EU states, regional governments, Japan, etc. This outbreak hurts them a lot. Is it a sign of how they will treat Christian minorities? Are they really able to govern? Or will it be warlordism?

CASIPLE: I think the international political support it has now has not changed. I think the MILF calculated shrewdly: they did the offensives, said they were not ordered by MILF and will be investigated, and the field commanders concerned are now saying they were not involved either. They are gambling nothing will come out of any legal suit and that the Arroyo administration is in too deep to have the political will to carry out an all-out military offensive.

The Lanao rampage certainly lost points for MILF both domestically and internationally but it thinks the risk is worth it: the posturing as a still credible force, the forcing of the hand of the Arroyo administration on the BJE, changing the Lanao del Norte demographics in favor of Moros, and laying the ground for a re-bid for an independent state (if negotiations fail).

LINGGA: In terms of propaganda, the attacks against some municipalities in Lanao del Norte is a setback to the MILF. However, the incidents bring to fore that if negotiations fail, violence will follow. If lessons are not learned, that to avoid recurrence of violence negotiations have to be pursued and the gains have to be preserved, we will be caught in the cycle of violence.

I see this setback as temporary because the international community understands that the MILF has been negotiating in good faith and it was government that plays around with the negotiations.

This indicates yet again that the MILF may not be totally in control of its elements. Do you think this problem in the MILF could worsen and could lead to a split?

ABUZA: Is it organized/ordered by the CC (Central Committee) or is it local commanders acting on their own? If it is the latter, then the CC really has no command and control. I expect Kato and Bravo to continue the violence. In June and July, when talks were stalled, there were spontaneous attacks across Mindanao. Those seemed to get the talks started. In their eyes, violence works. So I expect more.

CASIPLE: I think the factions in the MILF agree on the BJE and the offensives. It’s a question of how to do it that’s dividing them. However, I agree that the leadership is not in full control of field commanders (a guerilla formation usually has the problem). The leadership could not entirely prevent what happened so what they do is damage control. But it exposes the fact that the MILF does not really respect human rights, the niceties of democratic and legal processes, and that they do not have yet have the requisites of a responsible political movement and a credible aspirant for state governance.

WADI: Because of the rampage, the MILF leadership is in a dilemma. While it abhors the hooliganism of some of its commanders resulting from alleged frustration in the bungled signing of the MOA, the MILF has to show seriousness in disciplining its recalcitrant members so as to convince the GRP to continuously take the primacy of peace process. While it is not in the interest of the government to abandon the peace process similar with the MILF, the rampage has provided the GRP the necessary issues outside of the MOA to pressure the MILF. If the rampage didn’t happen, Malacanang would have been put on the defensive through and through.

A split in the MILF isn’t likely to happen. Commanders Kato and Bravo are hardcore members of the MILF and they have been with the organization since its inception. The MILF leadership is expected to defend them at all cost. As the smoke subsides, the crimes committed by the two commanders are expected to be included in the quid-pro-quo arrangement in the peace process. The government is expected to agree to any arrangement in the future since it could not force the MILF to hand the two commanders or else the peace process will collapse. The primacy of the peace process is important above anything else. The GRP cannot afford to have no peace talks with at least one group in Mindanao. And that group is presently represented by the MILF.