The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao

On 23 April 2000, the ASG seized a group of tourists in a raid on the Malaysian resort island of Sipadan, just south of Sulu. This was followed a year later by another high-profile abduction of tourists from Dos Palmas beach resort on Palawan. The abductions led to the escalation of the military campaign against the ASG in Sulu and created a dilemma for the MNLF: remain scattered in civilian communities across Sulu, or consolidate forces in clearly demarcated camps. The first would allow fighters to defend kith and kin against military depredations but risk their being caught up in anti-ASG sweeps. The second would create a clear line between ASG and MNLF but leave civilians defenceless. BMA fighters in camps could also be tempting targets for both sides. The ASG could try to pull the MNLF back into combat, and some elements of the military could see any insurgent base as a threat.

Resolving that dilemma was further complicated by MNLF chairman Nur Misuari’s waning authority, as his first term as regional governor, a position he secured as an informal corollary to the 1996 agreement, came to an end. In February 2001, the Philippine Congress finally passed legislation implementing the second phase of the agreement, involving new elections and an expanded ARMM.22 Misuari opposed the terms, and rival candidates for Manila’s imprimatur as new ARMM governor began manoeuvring against him. In April 2001 they announced an Executive Council of Fifteen (EC-15) had assumed control of the MNLF – and it was promptly recognised by the government.

To ensure his continued authority over BMA forces in Sulu, Misuari formed the Jabal Uhud Islamic Task Force, circumventing the MNLF chief of staff, Yusop Jikiri – then a member of the EC-15 and Manila’s choice to become governor of Sulu. Misuari loyalist Habier Malik became Task Force commander, and the MNLF’s de facto headquarters shifted to Malik’s camp in Bitanag, Panamao on Jolo.23 Misuari’s message to the MNLF was unmistakable: do not betray your leader’s command for the material rewards of political office. 24

Following the ransoming of most of the Sipadan hostages, the administration of President Joseph Estrada, fresh from its victory over the MILF at Camp Abubakar in July 2000, launched a major offensive, Oplan Sultan, on Jolo on 16 September 2000. Civilians endured the most brutal campaign since Ferdinand Marcos’s martial law, as swathes of the municipalities of Patikul, Talipao and Maimbung were virtually depopulated in the search for ASG.25 The MNLF lodged official complaints through a Joint Monitoring Committee – which deployed Indonesian military observers during phase one of the Jakarta agreement – but for more than a year did not strike back at the AFP.26

That changed after an assault on a camp under Malik’s command in Tiis, Talipao, on 19 October 2001. Seven MNLF men were killed, including several sons of local commanders Ustadz Mahmud and Unding Amang. The latter, brother of MNLF Sulu State Congress chairman Dawud Amang, called for retaliation against the AFP’s Camp Bautista. Exactly a month later, Misuari supporters stormed 104th army brigade headquarters in Jolo, killing eighteen soldiers, including a colonel. The AFP bombarded the home of Misuari’s in-laws the same day, and he fled to Malaysia.27

The MNLF on Jolo has inhabited a no-man’s-land ever since. Rather than acknowledge the breakdown of the Jakarta agreement, the government maintains the pretence that unintegrated BMA fighters are a fringe “renegade” group and a law-and-order issue. After Malaysia deported him in January 2002, Misuari remained in detention until April 2008. Manila meanwhile deals with co-opted rival leaders who command no significant armed following and are not recognised by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the peace process broker.

An OIC representative visited Jolo in May 2006, and called for renewed “tripartite” consultations (government-MNLF-OIC) in Jeddah over the 1996 agreement. Manila repeatedly reneged on the meeting, only carrying through in November 2007 after in effect barring Misuari from taking part.28 The Jeddah meeting established five Joint Working Groups (on Sharia law, education, political representation, a regional security force and the economy and natural resources) to review the agreement’s implementation. Further meetings were held in Manila and Istanbul in January and February 2008.