The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao

The U.S. country team seems deaf to these voices. Focusing exclusively on the strategy of civic action and military cooperation, Ambassador Kristie Kenney recommended ending USIP’s Philippine Facilitation Project, which had fostered the peace process since 2003. Its termination did not lead, as some hoped, to a more direct U.S. role in the talks. Rather, the socio-economic approach was reinforced in September 2007, with a five-year, $190 million U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) grant “focused on developing the business and economy of Mindanao”.141 Visits to MILF headquarters by the U.S. deputy chief of mission, Paul Jones, in November 2007, and Ambassador Kenney on 19 February 2008, appear to have focused on economic incentives as well. While the aid is welcome in an area where all social indicators are around the nation’s lowest, it is not a substitute for a political settlement.

MNLF leaders from Sulu also look to the U.S. to counter what Ustadz Murshi Ibrahim, the front’s secretary general, calls the “depoliticisation and localisation” of its struggle. “Where in the world are revolutionaries negotiating for development?”, asked the MNLF’s head of foreign affairs, Ustadz Abdulbaki Abubakar. “Socio-economic development should follow the political aspect – what use is it if they [Manila] control everything?” The MNLF seeks the return of international Joint Monitoring Committee observers while the Jakarta agreement is reassessed. But Manila fends off OIC involvement by insisting that security operations in Sulu are a “law enforcement campaign and … [a] purely domestic concern”.142

The government aims to weaken both the MILF and MNLF by drawing out the diplomatic process, anaesthetising rebel supporters with aid and selectively criminalising commanders who fail to cooperate. By filing murder charges against Habier Malik for the April 2007 fighting – but not Khaid Ajibun – Manila is attempting to drive a wedge into Sulu’s insurgency.143 This also involves pressing local MNLF leaders into service as go-betweens, enticing holdouts down from the hills. AFP units heighten tensions around MNLF communities by arriving unannounced to demand such mediation, equating refusal with sympathy for ASG. “There should be a third group to negotiate between the MNLF and the military – not the military itself”, argued a rebel based at Camp Amilhamja. “There is too much mistrust, and peace agreements cannot implement themselves”.144 In its determination to divide mainstream insurgents, Manila risks uniting them with terrorists.

conclusion
The “Mindanao model” of using counter-insurgency methods to fight terrorism has partially succeeded in separating the ASG from its support base on Basilan. High-profile visits to Sulu by Ambassador Kenney and U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Thomas Keating have turned a spotlight on the twin prongs of military and economic aid, credited with the demise of top Abu Sayyaf leaders. But the ASG is not the only source of terrorism. Extremists within the MILF continue to use terror tactics and provide refuge to the same jihadis working with the ASG, while ASG members and their jihadi allies pushed out to Jolo have found support in MNLF strongholds in a way that could reignite conflict there.

The MILF peace process may provide a template for those conflicts in which relatively distinct jihadis find sanctuary among popular insurgents. Military strategists who compare the war on terror to a global counter-insurgency campaign must understand the two-tiered nature of this nexus. Terrorists operating across borders against a global enemy do resemble classic insurgents, except the sea they swim in is not a sympathetic population – it is domestic rebellion. It is these domestic rebels who rely on popular support to manoeuvre; extremist jihadis embed themselves among them. And unlike the foreign jihadis, the ASG and the Moro extremists who harbour them, mainstream MILF and MNLF rebels are amenable to a negotiated political settlement.

Counter-terrorism’s proper goal in the Philippines is to separate jihadis from insurgents – not to separate insurgents and jihadis, conflated together, from the population at large. To attempt the latter is to fall into the trap of identifying the counter-terrorist cause with domestic counter-insurgency. This makes enemies of potential allies, reinforces insurgent-jihadi bonds, and may even lend jihadis popular legitimacy otherwise reserved for mainstream insurgents. It makes the international community’s stake in counter-terrorism hostage to domestic civil wars in ways that can make the latter even more intractable.

Properly understood, counter-terrorism and domestic conflict resolution are mutually reinforcing. The MILF model, demonstrated during Oplan Tornado, expelled local and foreign jihadis from the front’s midst, strengthening its moderates and boosting mutual confidence in the peace process at the same time. Because no equivalent mechanisms were built into the relationship between the Philippine government and the MNLF, however, the fugitives found sanctuary in Sulu. As joint U.S.-Philippine security operations continue, there is an urgent need to replace failed informal arrangements in Sulu with robust ceasefire and intelligence-sharing structures.

Such mechanisms cannot stand alone. They depend on a positive negotiating climate and forward momentum towards a substantive peace treaty. Without regular meetings between peace panels, performance cannot be reviewed, nor mandates renewed. Without progress on substance, insurgents have little incentive to cooperate. To the extent governments treat negotiation as a stalling tactic, hoping to weaken and divide insurgents, so too will insurgents use talks as a shield, striking, then retreating behind ceasefire machinery.

Jakarta/Brussels, 14 May 2008