The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao

The military mutiny, like “Hello Garci”, was rooted in allegations of cheating in the May 2004 elections in parts of Muslim Mindanao which were beyond normal scrutiny because of chronic disorder and warlordism.130 Relentless opposition pressure over the scandal reinforced Arroyo’s dependency on Muslim allies in those anarchic enclaves, led by the Ampatuan clan – whose dubious captive votes sparked the crisis. Impeachment and coup attempts strengthened cabinet hardliners, who shared Muslim traditionalists’ mistrust of the MILF and of Afable’s concessions. The eleventh round of talks, postponed due to the instability in Manila, ended on 21 March with the sides now “heaven and earth” apart.131 A twelfth round on 2-4 May failed to end the impasse, centred on the territorial delineation of the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). Heady optimism before the putsch gave way to an admission that there would be no agreement in 2006.132 Manila’s insistence on a constitutionally-required plebisicite in the villages and municipalities that it agreed to add to the ARMM was the chief hurdle.

Following the failed thirteenth round on 6-7 September 2006, Afable tried an innovative end run around the charter issue by introducing a “Right to Self-Determination” framework. As a “generally accepted principle of international law”, the collective right of peoples to freely determine their political status is constitutionally incorporated in Philippine domestic law.133 On 9 November, Afable suggested in a letter channelled through the Malaysians that the self-determination provision might offer a way around the sensitive sovereignty issue. The MILF took this as acceptance of its long-standing demand for a referendum and sought clarification at a “question and answer” session in Kuala Lumpur. Its negotiators, however, neither accepted nor rejected the proposal, requesting more detail.134

A new round of talks was scheduled for 1-2 May 2007 but abruptly cancelled as the administration braced for mid-term elections that potentially would determine its ability to withstand another impeachment drive. The crucial deciding votes for Senate candidates came from the same Muslim rotten boroughs as in 2004, threatening a new wave of turmoil in Manila.135

A post-election cabinet reshuffle tightened the conservatives’ grip, and three key officials — National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzalez and Interior Secretary Ronaldo Puno — intensified their opposition to Afable’s strategy. Afable’s position became untenable, as his negotiating mandate was in effect withdrawn, while pressure mounted to bring conservative allies like the Ampatuans on board, which was properly the president’s responsibility, not his.136 Manila compounded the “setback” of his resignation by immediately appointing a replacement without cabinet rank – which the MILF interpreted as a “deliberate downgrading” of the peace process.137

Many believe that the conservatives are actively trying to obstruct an agreement. A former U.S. official close to the Manila political elite said:

While there are many AFP officers who understand the distinction between the MILF and ASG, key senior seucirty officials tend to see Moro demands for self-determination as threatening their influence or interests. They therefore support the C[ounter-]T[errorism] effort as a means to prevent a peace settlement (and necessary sharing of political and economic power) with the MILF or the conscientious implementation of the 1996 MNLF agreement.138

The MILF’s chief negotiator, Mohagher Iqbal, believes only the U.S. can influence Manila to make an acceptable political offer. On 21 June 2007, the day AHJAG’s mandate expired, American officials met with the MILF to coordinate new aid projects. These were welcome, Iqbal said, “but not at the expense of the political aspect”. Aid donors, he added, appear not to understand that:

Self-governance of the Bangsamoro people is not a socio-economic problem – it’s a political problem, to be resolved politically, through a negotiated settlement. They are trying to kill the problem softly, based on the premise that poverty is the problem. It’s not.139

Another MILF panel member told Crisis Group: “None of this is new – we’ve seen it all before, in Marcos’s time. There’s no terminal point, no closure – they [Manila] prefer to ‘manage’ the problem. We are warning [MILF leader] Murad: economic packages that take the form of counter-insurgency won’t work”.140