The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao

Operating Enduring Freedom-Philippines has become a paradigm of the “indirect approach”. During the first half of 2002, 160 U.S. Special Forces deployed to Basilan in a dozen twelve-man A-teams attached to Philippine battalions, supported by three B-teams at AFP brigade level.113 A-teams conducted field surveys on local needs and accompanied Philippine daylight patrols. With additional security provided by U.S. marines, Navy engineers improved island infrastructure, and thousands of residents received free medical care – all hand-in-hand with Philippine personnel.114 When Balikatan 02-1’s mandate expired in July 2002, civic action and military training continued under the Bayanihan (Community Spirit) program, treating thousands more patients and improving the capability of at least ten AFP infantry battalions.115

By “putting the AFP in the lead”, according to military analysts, the indirect approach “enhanced government legitimacy at the grassroots” and “drove a wedge” between the population and Abu Sayyaf. With the ASG “isolated from local support networks”, an AFP rejuvenated with U.S. resources expelled the group from the island, allowing civilian professionals to return, and development agencies to begin addressing “root causes” of unrest. This was the epitome of a “successful [counter-insurgency] operation”.116

In a rare, critical, assessment, Colonel David Maxwell, who led the first U.S. battalion to deploy in Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and commanded U.S. forces in the south in 2007, faulted the operation’s failure to address the relationship between ASG, MILF and JI. He admitted this allowed the ASG to find refuge in “MILF-controlled areas”. But for Maxwell – one of the few U.S. military practitioners to acknowledge the MILF peace process – its mechanisms did not offer a way out of that conundrum. Rather, the talks “created de facto ASG sanctuaries”. The decision not to “directly attack the alliance of the three terrorist groups” and to “concentrate solely on the ASG”, he concluded, was a “strategic error”. Maxwell believed a “broad, combined campaign” should have covered the enemy’s entire area of manoeuvre, with U.S. combat forces targeting the “terrorist” MILF as well as ASG and JI.117 Nothing would have been more likely to fuse the three groups into an alliance.

B. From Basilan to Jolo

Conflation did not prove fatal on Basilan in 2002. The MNLF had largely demobilised on the island, and the MILF did not regard it as a significant theatre at the time. Neither group wanted to risk confrontation with U.S. forces. JI’s Wakalah Hudaibiyah was also focused on the mainland, where the Americans suffered their only combat casualty.118 The freelance jihadi presence was still insignificant. Six years on, Jolo presents a more complex challenge.

In Jolo, the cradle of Muslim separatism in the Philippines, attempts to “separate the insurgency from the population” are bound to fail. The population is the insurgency. The vast majority of Tausug residents, especially outside the capital town, view the AFP as an army of occupation. Under these conditions, the effect of the indirect approach is reversed: rather than enhancing government legitimacy, close association between Philippine and U.S. troops taints the Americans at the grassroots. Should conflict with the MNLF continue to escalate, this guilt by association will eclipse the goodwill purchased through civic action.

About 180 U.S. troops are stationed on the island at any given time, supported by another 170 at the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P)-Forward base, at AFP Western Mindanao Command headquarters in Zamboanga City.119 Attached to Philippine brigades and battalions as “liaison coordination elements”, special forces advisers are spread across the island in almost a dozen locations. Their primary counter-terrorism role is to provide real-time battlefield intelligence to the AFP, driving precision operations against the ASG.