In the third week, the action shifted north east. Unable to draw Ajibun’s men into the fray, the ASG made a break for Radullan’s home turf – the rugged and sparsely populated municipality of Patikul — taking many of the foreign jihadis with them. According to Dolorfino, the MNLF called to inform him of a large Abu Sayyaf group on the move, attempting to break out of the AFP cordon.66
Marines and Scout Rangers closed in on the ASG core group in a series of intensifying battles between 18 and 28 August 2006. Shortly before dawn on 4 September, marines came upon a small group of men at prayer in the village of Tugas, Patikul. Six marines died and nineteen were wounded in the fierce exchange that followed, as the group was reinforced from the surrounding woods. Only on 19 January 2007 did FBI (U.S.) forensic analysis confirm that Kadaffy Janjalani, the ASG’s supreme leader (amir), was among the dead.
In February 2008, an account of the battle surfaced from Mohamed Baehaqi, the Indonesian KOMPAK member captured in Mindanao. He said that before it began, ASG forces had divided into two parts, with Kadaffy leading one and Umar Patek the other. They had been marching the whole night and were so tired that they neglected to secure their perimeters and were attacked. One of Radullan Sahiron’s men tried to persuade Kadaffy to withdraw, but he thought he could exploit the weakness of the government forces, since so many had been wounded. In the battle that followed, Kadaffy was fatally hit in the neck. The ASG then withdrew, and a small group of top ASG leaders gathered to bury him, with one man recording the event on a video camera. Baehaqi, who appears to have been the only foreigner present, said they all kissed Kadaffy’s forehead as he was laid in the grave. 67
By the time Janjalani’s death was confirmed, Oplan Ultimatum had achieved another victory. Jainal Antel Sali, alias Abu Solaiman, the ASG’s high-profile mastermind, was shot dead by Philippine Army Special Forces near the summit of Bud Dajo, in Talipao, on 16 January 2007. Coming in such rapid succession, its top two commanders’ deaths provoked premature obituaries for the group.68 But just as the AFP prepared for the campaign’s conclusion, its gains began to slip through its fingers, as the “gentlemen’s agreement” with the MNLF broke down.
B. Breakdown
In a complaint to the OIC, which brokered the Jakarta and Bitanag agreements, the MNLF described an incident that occurred just two days after Abu Solaiman’s death as the start of military operations against it.69 Elements of the 3rd Marine Brigade were on patrol in the hamlet of Tandu Batu, Timpook, Patikul, on 18 January 2007, when, according to their after battle report, they encountered 50 to 60 ASG under Albader Parad. Nine “enemy” and five AFP fatalities resulted.70 Surviving villagers told a different story.
Siliya Usman, whose husband Kaddam, an MNLF commander, and adult son Taib were among at least eight local residents killed, claimed the military attacked her community without provocation, killing three on the spot. Taib and Kaddam fled, flagging down a passenger jeep bound for Jolo town, 25 km distant. The vehicle ran a marine checkpoint, which fired on it, killing the driver, his son, Taib, Kaddam and another passenger.71
Local leaders explained to Crisis Group that the Tandu Batu villagers were involved in a clan feud (rido) and had been startled by the sudden appearance of armed men over a rise near the Usmans’ house. It is unclear who opened fire first, but the origins of the tragedy lie in the ambiguous status of armed MNLF communities in Jolo’s volatile environment. One month earlier, a military raid on another MNLF community on Daungdong Island, south of Jolo, caused a pregnant woman to miscarry. And a month after Tandu Batu, inexperienced scout rangers ambushed two boys returning home late in the evening in Tagbak, Indanan, on the fringes of Camp Marang. Fourteen-year old Hakim Hamsijani Abbilul, a nephew of Khaid Ajibun’s, died, as did one soldier, apparently from friendly fire.72
Mounting tensions became manifest on 2 February 2007, when government negotiators were detained in the MNLF’s second major camp on Jolo – Jabal Uhud – by its commander, Ustadz Habier Malik. The government party, led by Gen. Dolorfino, were there to negotiate a settlement of the Tandu Batu incident. They agreed on a payment of 50,000 pesos ($1,100) per victim as “financial assistance”, with a deduction for the dead marines, and for both sides to return captured weapons.73 But then Ramon Santos, undersecretary with the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), told Malik that the planned OIC meeting in Jeddah had been postponed, and Malik “became agitated”.74
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May 14th, 2008 at 8:43 pm
[...] Counterinsurgency vs Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao An MILF fighter in Sultan Kudarat. | Read the ICG’s report here. [...]
August 21st, 2008 at 9:15 pm
tnx..poh nagawa q rin ung project q more pose to come…