Malaysia’s Pullout and Its Implications for Mindanao

The GRP, as revealed by General Garcia, would like to invite other countries to join the IMT as government’s way of “correcting the situation, doing damage control, making necessary adjustments and moves,”13 but it cannot act unilaterally. Decisions to invite other countries have to be made jointly by the two parties.

For Malaysia to reconsider its decision, the GRP and the MILF have to jointly make the request. To invite other countries to join the IMT and to renew the IMT mandate need approval by the two parties. These actions can only be made when the negotiations resume. On this aspect the MILF position is clear that discussion on the IMT issue is contingent upon the progress in the negotiations. To the MILF, the issue is not the pull out of the Malaysian peace monitors but “the very sincerity and true intention of the Government to pursue the Peace Talks”.14 In response to the verbal request of Gen. Garcia conveyed through Gen. Tan Sri Dato’ Sri Abdul Aziz bin Hj Zainal, Chief of Defense Force of the Malaysian Armed Forces, for the GRP and MILF peace panels to meet in Kuala Lumpur to discuss Malaysia’s pull-out, Mohagher Iqbal said: “the exploratory talks in Malaysia could only resume if there is a commitment that the two parties shall tackle the ancestral domain issue based on the consensus points and that the issue confronting the IMT can be tackled as a secondary agenda matter.” He said further, “(b)ut to resume the talks only for the purpose of discussing the IMT pullout, a big no way.”15

Implications to Security

Without third party monitors on the ground, it will be difficult to sustain the ceasefire. Even if Brunei, Libya and Japan will not pull out their contingents, the IMT will have only 18 personnel and five of them are civilians. With this number the IMT will certainly face difficulties in responding to clashes that might occur.

The first formal ceasefire agreement between the GRP and MILF after the start of the formal negotiations between the two parties was on January 27, 1997. The truce was agreed upon to prevent the conflict in Buldon from spilling over to other areas. The conflict started when the AFP attempted to intrude into what the MILF claimed as perimeter defense of Camp Abu Bakre. The coverage of the interim cessation of hostilities was limited in the municipality of Buldon and its immediate environment.

The truce that binds all forces of the GRP and MILF to observe was inked on July 18, 1997 in Cagayan de Oro following the massive military operations of government forces in the municipalities of Pagalungan and Sultan sa Barongis in Maguindanao and Pikit in Cotabato Province. The ceasefire was holding until the government launched the all-out war against the MILF in year 2000.

In March 2001, the two parties recommitted to observe the ceasefire after the MILF agreed for the resumption of the talks. But after two years, government forces attacked again MILF positions in Boliok.

Third party facilitator was not involved at the start of the negotiations. From 1997 to 2000, no third party was involved in the negotiations and there was no ceasefire monitor present on the ground. From 2001 to 2003, Malaysia facilitated the talks but no third party was monitoring the observance of the ceasefire. From 2004 to the present, Malaysia continues to facilitate the talks and the IMT contingents are on the ground.

At the time when no third party ceasefire monitors are on the ground, we experienced two major wars, other than hundreds of minor clashes between the GRP and MILF forces. From 1997 to 2000 we experienced one major war that displaced an estimated 932,000 people,16 and from 2001 to 2003, we had again another war that dislocated 393,039 people.17 From 2004 to the present, we have not experienced war and ceasefire-related incidents dramatically declined.

Without the IMT, or even if it is still there but with reduced personnel, the risks of increased violent encounters between GRP and MILF forces will be high. Past experiences also shows the possibility of another major war to happen is something that cannot be dismissed.

The capability of the GRP and MILF Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) to manage eruption of hostilities is doubtful. The CCCH was already in placed since 1997 but was unable to prevent the two major wars and hundreds of clashes between GRP and MILF forces. A case in point is on April 27, 2000 the peace panels met until late in the evening and signed the Aide Memoire that enumerated the steps to be taken to defuse the tensions along Ramos highway near Camp Abubakre, but the CCCH was unable to prevent the military attack on Camp Abubakre at dawn the following day.