Malaysia’s Pullout and Its Implications for Mindanao

On the side of the MILF, its Committee on Information made available to media a paper entitled, “Summary of Events Leading to the Pullback of the IMT and Crisis in the GRP-MILF Peace Talks,” which explains why the negotiations are not moving forward. The paper, among others things, states:

“1. On December 15-17, 2007 supposed 15th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks, the government presented two drafts Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on ancestral domain, one uncleared version (15 pages) and the other cleared version (8 pages) but still footnoted “subject to additional inputs” which were to come from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Both drafts especially the second one drifted too far from the consensus points on the four strands of ancestral domain, namely, concept, resources, territory, and governance, which the Parties have jointly and painstakingly “crafted, agreed, and signed” since more than three years ago in December 2004. This irrational approach or duplicity caused the abortion of the talks. The MILF peace panel refused to meet their counterpart, saying “it served no purpose” after the government deliberately tinkered with the consensus points. Instead, it provided the GRP peace panel with all the signed documents on ancestral domain, reminding them that they were not honoring what they have agreed and signed; and

“2. After settling all the remaining minor issues related to the four strands of ancestral domain, thanks to the shuttle of Datuk Othman bin Abdulrazak, Malaysia’s chief facilitator of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks, between Manila and Darapanan, Sultan Kudarat, Shariff Kabunsuan on February 19-22, 2008, the Philippine government created a legal team to examine the legality or constitutionality of the agreed Draft Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). This is another weird move that serves no purpose except to delay the talks and tax the patience of the Malaysian Government, if not to insult its facilitator outrightly. Like the MILF peace panel, the GRP peace panel, is clothed with authority to bind and commit its Principal. Oftentimes, before every talk begins, each panel has to show their credential attesting that they are really empowered to commit and bind their respective principals. In actual practice, the GRP peace panel and the MILF peace panel, even if they have their respective mandates, never decided on major issues except after getting clearance or guidance from their respective principals. So, why is there a need for the government to create the legal team, after it clothed its peace panel with the power and authority to commit and bind the government in the talks, if not for dubious reasons and nothing more? Why has the government to be diligent only now, to borrow the argument of Secretary Jesus Dureza, when the Parties are ready to sign the MOA?”

Malaysia is withdrawing its contingents not because of the poor performance of the IMT but because of the slow movements in the negotiations. The trouble in the on-going talks, according to Datuk Othman’s, “is that things are not moving in the talks,” and this is because the “ball is in the (Philippine government’s) court, but they have been sitting on it.”12

Implications to IMT

Since around seventy percent of the personnel are from Malaysia, the immediate effect of Malaysia’s pull-out is the reduction of peace monitors in the field. Following the report that around 21 Malaysian peacekeepers will leave on May 10, the IMT is closing down four team sites in the following areas: Team Site 2 based in Iligan City, Team Site 3 based in Zamboanga City, Team Site 4 based in General Santos City and Team Site 5 based in Metro Davao. Only team site 1 and the headquarters in Cotabato City will remain open. This means no more peace monitors on the ground in Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga Sibugay, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, South Cotabato, Sarangani, and Davao provinces.

From May 10 to September 9, 2008, the number of IMT monitors will be reduced significantly and their presence will be in Cotabato City only. This certainly diminishes the capability the IMT to respond to crises situation, especially when it will happen in areas far from Cotabato City.

The head of mission and the deputy are from Malaysia. The head of mission usually holds the rank of major general. After Malaysia’s pull-out the Brunei and Libya’s contingents will have to decide who will be the head of mission, and none of the remaining officers is a general. This means downgrading of the status of the head of mission. A head of mission with lower military rank will have difficulty relating with commanders in the field with high military ranks.

Once Malaysia’s pull-out of its contingents will be completed, the mandate of the IMT will also expire. Unless the mandate is renewed, which have to be decided jointly by the GRP and MILF, the Brunei, Libyan and Japanese contingents will have to leave. It will not be possible for them to stay in the field without the mandate. The renewal of the mandate needs the joint approval of the GRP and MILF, which will be possible only when the GRP and MILF will meet. Neither the GRP nor MILF can act on it unilaterally.

Composition of IMT-IV

Country Military Civilian Total
Malaysia 38 3 41
Brunei 10 10
Libya 3 4 7
Japan 1 1
Total 51 8 59