Malaysia’s Pullout and Its Implications for Mindanao

By Abhoud Syed M. Lingga
Executive Director
Institute of Bangsamoro Studies

Introduction

Last April 21, 2008, the Foreign Minister of Malaysia Rais Yatim made an unexpected announcement that his government will not send peace monitors once the mandate of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) will expire on September 9, 2008. Three days later, Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, he is also the defense minister announced that the “phased withdrawal” starts on May 10, and 21 contingents leaving on that date. 2 The schedule of departure of other contingents to be determine later.

The announcement causes concern that it might has effect on peace in Mindanao. The uncertainties of the situation once the Malaysian monitors depart were expressed both by the GRP and MILF. General Rodolfo Garcia, chief government negotiator with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), said, “There’s no guarantee of continued stability on the ground in the south if the Malaysians pack up their bags and go home.” 3 Mohagher Iqbal, chief MILF negotiator, was quoted by media to have said,” I don’t want to paint a gloomy scenario, but the pull back of the Malaysian international monitoring team members gives a very grave signal to everyone.”4 The Mindanao People’s Caucus raise the alarm that, the “pullout of the IMT led by the Government of Malaysia will clearly have dire consequences on the lives of people in the conflict-affected areas.”5

The concerns are valid because Malaysia is facilitating the on-going negotiations between the government and the MILF, leading the IMT and contributed around seventy percent of its personnel. Because of these concerns, there is pressing need to look into the possible implications of Malaysia’s decision to pull-back its contingents in the IMT.

To contribute to the discussions, I will attempt to look into the implications of Malaysia’s pull-out to the continued presence of IMT in Mindanao; to the security situation in conflict-affected areas; and the peace process. My views are basically derived from the history of the conflict and the peace process, supplemented by my little knowledge on Bangsamoro affairs. I am not privy to what the conflicting parties are thinking about, which to greater degree determine the future trajectory of the conflict that makes views like that of mine insignificant.

Roles of the IMT in the Peace Process

The role of the IMT is primarily to provide support to the peace process. While the peace panels negotiate to achieve peace, it is essential that ceasefire is in placed and sustained to provide space to build confidence among conflicting parties. So the presence of the IMT is necessary to keep the negotiations going and to preserve achieved gains.

Specifically, the tasks of the IMT are to observe and monitor implementation of cessation of hostilities and the socio-economic development aspects of signed agreements; conduct field verifications to validate any reported violations of the cessation of hostilities; coordinate closely with GRP and MILF Coordinating Committee on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and the Local Monitoring Teams on conduct of field verifications and validation of reported ceasefire violations; and report to GRP Peace Panel and MILF Peace Panel the findings of verification/validation of reported violations of ceasefire.

Probably, learning lessons from the 2000 war that ceasefire without monitors on the ground cannot hold, the GRP and MILF negotiators in 2001 agreed “to invite representatives of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to observe and monitor the implementation of all GRP-MILF Agreements.”6 This was reiterated in the agreement on the “Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001” and this time other than the OIC, Indonesia, Libya and Malaysia were specifically mentioned to be invited. The agreement states, “The Parties hereby invite representatives from the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), in particular Indonesia, Libya and Malaysia.” Invitations were sent but the OIC and Indonesia were not keen on the idea.

The urgency of third party monitors was felt when the Philippine government violated again the ceasefire when on February 11, 2003 it started bombarding Boliok (two adjoining villages with same name and located in Pikit and Pagalungan) and the surrounding communities, the day Muslims all over the world were celebrating eid el adha (feast of sacrifice). That would had put a stop to the negotiations if not of the interventions of Malaysia because the MILF threatened to withdraw from the peace talks in protest against the GRP violations of the ceasefire. The Malaysian facilitator was able to convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table and after their March 27-28, 2003 meeting, the two parties agreed “to improve the existing mechanism or monitoring of the cessation of hostilities including the composition of an observer/monitoring group as provided for in the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001.”

At this time Malaysia, Brunei and Libya agreed to contribute contingents to constitute the monitoring team. The terms of reference on the deployment of peace monitors was approved on September 8, 2004 in Kuala Lumpur and the implementing guidelines to the TOR on October 4, 2004 in Metro Manila.

Generally, the IMT mission in Mindanao is successful and has contributed significantly in sustaining the ceasefire and in helping create the environment for continued trust in the negotiations.