Bonnie S. Glaser: Will China Seize the Opportunity to Improve Cross-Strait Relations?

An early opportunity to provide Taiwan with greater international space will emerge May 19 at the World Health Assembly meeting, a day prior to Ma’s inauguration. It is unfortunate that Chen Shui-bian has opted to apply again this year, as last year, for both membership and observership using the name “Taiwan.” This has most likely let Beijing off the hook this year, although if China wanted to seize the opportunity to make a goodwill gesture, it could work out an arrangement for action by the WHA to grant observer status to Taiwan under the name “Chinese Taipei” on the second or third day of the session, once Ma is sworn into the presidency and has declared his unambiguous support for “one China, respective interpretations.”

Chinese officials say that the WHA meeting is simply too soon and no progress can be made this year. Perhaps. But it is a missed opportunity for China to demonstrate creativity and flexibility. Based on conversations I have had in recent weeks with Chinese officials, I worry that China’s fear that the DPP could return to power in four or eight years may dictate Beijing’s approach to the international space issue and result in a decision to offer Taiwan only limited participation in international organizations in ways that can be easily reversed. Such a decision would undoubtedly disappoint the United States, not to mention the Taiwan people.

Competition between the mainland and Taiwan for diplomatic allies should end immediately. If a country that is allied with Taiwan changes its diplomatic allegiance to Beijing prior to Ma’s inauguration or shortly thereafter, this would slow the momentum on Taiwan in favor of engaging the mainland. A truce should be tacitly adhered to for several months or longer. Chinese officials contend that Beijing is hard-pressed to reject the request by countries allied with Taiwan to establish diplomatic relations with China. If there are such cases, China should have prior consultations with Taipei and work with Taiwan to ensure a smooth transition so that Taiwan can maintain unofficial representative offices in those countries and protect its economic and other interests.

Military/security issues in PRC-Taiwan relations are not likely to be dealt with immediately, but it is clear that Ma and the KMT want to engage on this set of concerns and make concrete progress in the first term. Prior to the opening of authorized talks on ending cross-Strait hostility, China can take steps to signal goodwill. Dismantlement of a brigade of short-range ballistic missiles deployed along China’s southeastern coast would be a symbolic gesture that the U.S. and Taiwan would welcome. Declaring a freeze on missile deployments would enable Ma and the KMT to avoid criticism that they are engaging the mainland while China continues to increase the threat to Taiwan’s security. Indeed, Ma has said that he will not agree to launch talks on a peace accord while the missiles aimed at Taiwan remain in place. Just a few days ago, Ma told a delegation that I led to Taipei, “Once we decide to negotiate a peace agreement it will be embarrassing if more than 1,000 missiles are targeting us.”