Bonnie S. Glaser: Will China Seize the Opportunity to Improve Cross-Strait Relations?

By Bonnie S. Glaser

Of the combinations of outcomes of the Taiwan election – a DPP or KMT victory, the passage or defeat of one or both of the referenda – the March 22 result in which Ma Ying-jeou won by a substantial margin and both referenda failed was the result that Beijing hoped for. The new situation presents a historic and strategic opportunity for China to transform cross-Strait relations. The United States hopes that Beijing will respond positively to the new situation and without delay.

In his congratulatory message to the people of Taiwan, President Bush stated: “It falls to Taiwan and Beijing to build the essential foundations for peace and stability by pursuing dialogue through all available means and refraining from unilateral steps that would alter the cross-Strait situation. I believe the election provides a fresh opportunity for both sides to reach out and engage one another in peacefully resolving their differences.” It should be clear from these remarks as well as from the comments in Bush’s subsequent phone call with President Hu Jintao that the U.S. is firmly in favor of improved cross-Strait relations. I believe that this robust support will extend beyond the Bush presidency.

Ma and the KMT are eager to move forward first on the economic agenda. This includes regular weekend charter flights beginning July 1 and daily scheduled flights by the end of the year, permitting more Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, relaxing China-bound investment caps on Taiwan businesses, reaching agreement on avoiding double taxation, making arrangements for convertibility of currency, and establishing improved financial services for businessmen.

U.S. involvement in the implementation of these initiatives is unnecessary. The primary U.S. interest is that Beijing move with alacrity so as to boost domestic support in Taiwan for Ma’s change in policy away from emphasis on Taiwan’s separate independent identity toward the establishment of a new modus vivendi with the mainland. If China moves too slowly, this may deprive Ma and the KMT of the backing they need to sustain a policy approach that has not yet won the support of the 42 percent of Taiwanese voters who cast their votes for the DPP. With the view widely held in both the U.S. and Taiwan that Taiwan’s economic success will depend in large part on expanding economic ties with the mainland, Beijing must take steps that promote mutually beneficial outcomes and avoid increasing Taiwan’s vulnerability to mainland pressure.

On one aspect, however, the U.S. has a strong interest, and that is permitting foreign (i.e., American) airlines to participate in the direct flights once they have moved beyond the charter flight stage and are occurring on a scheduled daily basis. The U.S. does not seek to define cross-Strait flights as international flights, but rather seeks opportunities for U.S. airlines to expand their routes and increase profits.

Pursuit of greater international space for Taiwan follows the implementation of economic items on Ma’s agenda. Achieving progress in this area is essential. U.S. opposition to the DPP-initiated referendum to join the United Nations under the name Taiwan should not be misconstrued as indicating reduced U.S. support for meaningful participation by Taiwan in the international community.