By Robert Sutter » Is Taiwan ‘Over’? – I think Not

In these circumstances, a new Taiwan administration in May 2008 that plays down Taiwan’s recent record of highly publicized provocations with China appears to have the option at the same time to develop smoothly closer and cooperative security and other relations with the U.S. administration and Congress. Recent reports and statements by pro-Taiwan advocates in the Congress, media, and elsewhere strongly demonstrate U.S. receptivity to a Taiwan administration that can build consensus at home behind appropriate Taiwan contributions and cooperative work with the U.S. in securing a stable environment in the Taiwan area. If done quietly and preferably in tandem with planned Taiwan efforts to improve relations with the mainland, this upswing in U.S.-Taiwan cooperation likely will not elicit negative reaction in the Asian region. Governments there appear likely to continue their generally supportive or neutral policies and postures regarding the multifaceted hedging efforts by the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific, including growing security cooperation with Taiwan.

· The new Taiwan administration’s pursuit of a less acrimonious relationship with China, which seems likely, probably will reinforce China’s rationale to avoid confrontation, even as Taiwan pursues quiet and steady closer integration with U.S. defense preparations in the Asia-Pacific. One possible test of this dynamic will occur if the Bush administration allows the proposed sale of advanced F-16 fighters to Taiwan.

· It is unclear whether China will react in ways that are so strong that they will change the prevailing positive stasis in U.S.-China relations. The timing of the possible U.S. arms sales announcement relative to the August 2008 Olympics in China may have a bearing on China’s reaction.

· It also is unclear whether the new Taiwan administration will be willing to face the budgetary consequences and the consequences for cross-Strait relations of accepting such a sale.

· Asian governments reacting to a major public dispute between the U.S. and China over such a possible arms sale would probably prefer to avoid taking sides, though some may criticize the sale.

Taiwan as a barometer of China’s intentions

As Taiwan strengthens its security under the U.S.-led hedge regarding China’s rise in Asia, Taiwan also has the option to expand important international relations with Asian and other powers wary of China’s rise. Most Asian governments welcome China’s rise but they also maneuver, plan contingencies, and position their governments in the face of possible negative consequences for them posed by China’s rise. Many leaders of Asian governments and some other world powers remain attentive to possible signs of more aggressive, domineering or disruptive Chinese approaches. Taiwan is a focal point of this interest; it is the “canary in the mineshaft” providing reassurance of continuity in existing Chinese policies and a warning of a more assertive or aggressive Chinese postures.

As a result, prudent Asian and other world leaders probably have and will develop an increasing interest in intelligence exchanges and other security dialogues with Taiwan under appropriate conditions. Such appropriate circumstances presumably include, for example, that Taiwan avoid politicizing and publicizing these contacts. In the same vein, Taiwan will need to establish and maintain a reputation of providing accurate intelligence that avoids the suspicion of bias or misinformation. Under what appear at present to be good conditions for developing such interchanges, a new Taiwan administration that is discreet and possesses adequate resources from the legislature appears to have a good opportunity to develop a wide range of meaningful official but deniable relations. Partners in these exchanges would include many governments in the Asia-Pacific hedging against possible adverse developments in China’s rise, along with powers elsewhere (e.g. European powers and Middle Eastern oil producers), with an interest in monitoring changes in the intentions and actions of the Chinese leadership as China’s influence rises in Asian and world affairs.

Robert Sutter (sutterr@georgetown.edu) is professor of Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington DC. He along with Chin-Hao Huang writes the chapter on China Southeast Asia relations in Comparative Connections, the Pacific Forum’s quarterly electronic journal.