By Robert Sutter » Is Taiwan ‘Over’? – I think Not

· Develop effective overt and covert funding and implementation mechanisms that allow Taiwan’s considerable resources to be focused on a circle of small-nation allies less susceptible to Beijing’s attractiveness as a global trading power and UN Security Council member.

· Build on the upswing in foreign direct investment into Taiwan in order to deepen already important economic interest of developed countries in preserving Taiwan’s separate status and stability in cross strait relations.

· Strengthen funding and other support for the expansion of Taiwan’s ostensibly unofficial international presence with over 100 overseas offices and some salient international organizations (e.g. World Trade Organization, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and Asian Development Bank), and memberships in many hundreds of international nongovernment organizations.

Expand international relations under the hedge

More important for Taiwan’s security and international standing is the option for Taiwan to exploit effectively U.S., Asian, and international wariness regarding the rise of China. There is a dualism at play with the rise of China that seems likely to last for many years and has an important implication for Taiwan. On the one hand, it makes Taiwan’s future separate from China appear bleak as the U.S. and other powers cooperate more closely with China. On the other hand, it prompts a wide range of contingency plans, known generally as “hedging.” This hedge, if used adroitly by Taiwan, provides security for Taiwan and the opportunity to expand important international connections.

In recent years, there has been no notable opposition in the U.S., Asia, or elsewhere to the build up of U.S. forces, large-scale U.S. military exercises, and other significant security moves that are part of the U.S. contingency efforts to deal with possible negative consequences of China’s rise. Several Asian nations (e.g., Japan, Australia, Singapore, and India) have been increasingly active in military cooperation with the U.S. in these exercises and in other ways. These efforts have included unprecedented and apparently growing U.S. security cooperation with Taiwan, which has not been criticized by most Asian governments or other concerned foreign powers.

Part of the reason for this is that the U.S. has engaged China and managed relations with China in ways that encourage Chinese leaders to see their interests best served by emphasizing the positive in relations with the United States. This was not always the case. Until 2001, China strongly criticized the very active and multifaceted U.S. strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific and directed public and private Chinese pressure on Asian governments to eschew close strategic cooperation with the United States. However, China found that U.S. firmness and Asian disapproval made such criticism and pressure counterproductive for Chinese interests; it decided to shift to its more moderate approach, limiting most public criticism to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.