The Arroyo Imbroglio in the Philippines

In the meantime, democratic institutions in the Philippines continue to be under major stress. For some, democracy has lost its appeal and military intervention has become an attractive option. Those who want to see the perpetuation of civilian democratic structures might draw some comfort from the reflection that the Philippine military has never launched a successful grab for power, despite many attempts. Given the current weakness of political institutions, however, it would be a mistake to dismiss the possibility of a coup. After all, the odds that such an attempt might succeed depend not only on the capability of a group of disgruntled soldiers but also upon the nature of the political institutions that are being targeted.

Although the Philippines can boast the oldest democratic structures in Asia, they are currently weak and lacking in legitimacy. Battered by scandal after scandal, these structures need careful and well-considered reform if they are to survive. With particular attention to the goal of strengthening political parties, it is important to build a democracy that can overcome its historical shortcomings and begin to demonstrate responsiveness not just to the privileged few but to the citizenry as a whole.

NOTES
Thanks to Cleo Calimbahin, Sheila Coronel, Jose Luis Gascon, and Joel Rocamora for offering valuable comments and suggestions. Any errors or omissions are mine alone.

1. For a more detailed study, see Paul D. Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora, “Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines,” Journal of East Asian Studies 3 (May–August 2003): 259–92.

2. Benedict Anderson, “Cacique Democracy and the Philippines: Origins and Dreams,” New Left Review 169 (May–June 1988): 3–33.

3. The current exemplars are the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) and Newsbreak magazine.

4. Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “The Left, Elections, and the Political Party System in the Philippines,” Critical Asian Studies 37 (March 2005): 4–5.

5. Bantay Eleksyon (People’s Coalition to Monitor the 2007 Elections), “Final Report on the 2007 Elections,” www.iper.org.ph/CER/bantayeleksyon2007/reports/final-report07-election.html.

6. Roberto Verzola, “The True Results of the 2004 Philippine Presidential Election Based on the NAMFREL Tally,” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies Vol. 19, No. 2 (2004): 92–118. For a brief summary of corruption charges against the Palace, see “Shame and Scandal in the Family,” “The Queens’ Gambit,” special edition, i-Report (Quezon City, Philippines), July 2005, 28–29.

7. The “Gloria-Garcillano” tapes can be heard at http://pcij.org/blog/wp-files/tapes.php; transcriptions from one key tape are printed in “The Queens’ Gambit,” 39–51.

8. See Sheila S. Coronel, “The Unmaking of a President,” in “The Queens’ Gambit,” 3–5.

9. For polling data, see Social Weather Stations, www.sws.org.ph; Macapagal-Arroyo was the vice-presidential candidate on de Venecia’s 1998 Lakas Party ticket; she won the office while de Venecia lost badly. De Venecia seems to have concluded that the only way he could become chief executive of the Philippines would be as party leader in a parliamentary system.

10. Luz Rimban, “The Man Who Would Be President,” i-Report, no. 3 (September 2005), www.pcij.org/i-report/3/noli.html.

11. Sheila S. Coronel, “The Philippines in 2006: Democracy and Its Discontents,” Asian Survey 47 (February 2007): 176.

12. Amnesty International, “Philippines: Political Killings, Human Rights, and the Peace Process,” 15 August 2006, 1–2, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA350062006?open&of=ENG-PHL; Human Rights Watch, “Scared Silent: Impunity for Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines,” June 2007, http://hrw.org/reports/2007/ philippines0607web.pdf, 3; Report of Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings, 22 January 2007, 1; The UN Office at Geneva, “UN Expert Says Extrajudicial Killings in Phillipines [sic] Have a Corrosive Effect on Civil Society and Political Discourse,” Press Release, 22 February 2007.

13. Reporters Without Borders, “Philippines—Annual Report 2006,” available at www.rsf.org; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Attacks on the Press in 2006, Philippines,” www.cpj.org/attacks06/asia06/phil06.html. For fuller analysis of the current state of civil liberties and rule of law in the Philippines, see Hutchcroft, “The Philippines,” Countries at the Crossroads 2007 (New York: Freedom House, 2007), available at www.freedomhouse.org.

14. “It’s Done: House Set to Convene Constituent Assembly,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 December 2006.

15. NAMFREL, “The Terminal Report to NAMFREL Operation Quick Count 2004,” 30 June 2004, 2. Despite the magnitude of the problem, the report refutes those who allege “massive disenfranchisement,” which might be taken as further indication of NAMFREL’s eagerness to legitimize the elections.

16. Aries Rufo, “The Sins of Abalos,” Newsbreak, July–September 2007, 34–36; and Gemma Bagayaua, “Guns, Fealty, and Money,” Newsbreak, July–September 2007, 51–53.

17. Rocamora, “Equal-Opportunity Violence,” i-Report, 7 February 2007, http://pcij.org/i-report/2007/political-violence2.html; Alecks Pabico, “Were the 2007 Elections Less Violent?” 5 July 2007, http://i-site.ph/blog/?p=217#more-217; for a critique of police statistics, see Bantay Eleksyon, “Final Report of the 2007 Elections.”

18. See Alfred W. McCoy, “Covert Netherworlds: Clandestine Services and Criminal Syndicates in Shaping the Philippine State,” in Tim Lindsey and Eric Wilson, eds., Government of the Shadows (London: Pluto Press, forthcoming). “De Venecia calls on Arroyo to set up new administration,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 18 October 2007; De Venecia’s candid appraisal came amid mounting tensions between him and the president, in the course of which his influence has been curbed.

19. Gabriella R. Montinola, “Parties and Accountability in the Philippines,” Journal of Democracy 10 (January 1999): 133. On the dangers of unintended consequences, see Allen Hicken, “Party Fabrication: Constitutional Reform and the Rise of the Thai Rak Thai,” Journal of East Asian Studies 6 (September–December 2006): 381–407. An argument for incremental reform can be found in Jürgen Rüland, “Constitutional Debates in the Philippines: From Presidentialism to Parliamentarism?” Asian Survey 43 (May 2003): 461–84.