Brad Glosserman and Bonnie Glaser » Let Sober Realism Guide U.S.-China Relations in 2008

Second, the two governments must insulate the military to military relationship from the ups and downs of politics. In Sept., China canceled all bilateral mil-mil exchanges for October – a total of eight – likely in protest for U.S. notification to Congress of arms sales to Taiwan. When the Bush administration proceeded with another notification to Congress of arms sales in November (following granting of the Congressional Medal of Honor to the Dalai Lama), the Chinese apparently decided to temporarily deny U.S. ships access to Hong Kong harbor. Such actions take a toll on the bilateral relationship but they will not convince the U.S. to rethink its policy of selling arms to Taiwan, which is required by U.S. law and serves U.S. interests in preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

After the contretemps over the Kitty Hawk incident, the two countries agreed to look forward, not back. Getting beyond this controversy is apparently deemed the best option by both sides. While this episode should not undermine cooperation between the two countries in other spheres, failing to address the many worrisome issues raised by this incident ensures that strategic mistrust will continue to fester in the bilateral relationship. Mistrust and a lack of transparency lead to a reliance on worst-case assumptions and deepen downward trends in the relationship. Our militaries and our security planners need to engage in frank and detailed discussions about strategic intentions. This includes a dialogue on strategic nuclear issues that U.S. and Chinese presidents agreed upon in April 2006, but has yet to get underway due at an official level to Chinese hesitation. (The authors are both involved with track-two efforts to fill this void.)

A third imperative is seizing opportunities to cooperate and build trust and mutual confidence. As large trading economies with global contacts and contracts, the list of shared interests is long. Washington and Beijing should take every chance to work together on those issues, from energy security to trade security to product safety, pushing the Doha trade talks and the post-Kyoto Protocol climate negotiations. The recent Bali talks made plain the critical role the two countries play and demonstrated that progress begins when the U.S and China engage and press for positive results.

A caveat is critical here. While U.S.-China cooperation is essential, it cannot look like those two governments are creating a condominium that excludes other governments. Our chief concern is Japan. Japanese insecurities are growing for a number of reasons, one of which is fear of being bypassed as the U.S. and China work together. Trilateral cooperation is therefore vital to allay Japanese fears of being ignored, as well as to involve a key player that can contribute greatly to the resolution of regional and global problems. Beijing should not be under the illusion that working with the U.S. or trilateral cooperation will dilute the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The U.S.-China relationship is, like any relationship among large countries, complex. Observers see in it what they choose to see. Optimists focus on the two countries’ growing shared interests and the framework for dialogue and problem solving that has emerged in recent years; pessimists concentrate on the uncertainties that loom large in the relationship and the all but inevitable clash between the prevailing superpower and the rising challenger.

Washington and Beijing should continue to work together where their interests overlap – building habits of cooperation that will better position the two countries to manage friction whenever and wherever it emerges. A successful relationship will require ongoing frank dialogue and greater transparency about both countries’ strategic intentions. Appropriate expectations are vital. Sober realism, then, must be the constant in U.S.-China relations. For better or for worse, 2008 will provide ample opportunities to measure the gap between expectations and reality.

Brad Glosserman (bradg@hawaii.rr.com) is executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS. Bonnie Glaser (bglaser6@comcast.net) is senior associate at the Pacific Forum and at CSIS in Washington, D.C.