‘Nobody Can Blame Me Anymore’

By CARLOS H. CONDE

Nur Misuari, the 61-year-old founder of the Moro National Liberation Front, retreated to his hometown in Jolo after he was sacked by President Arroyo as chairman of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). That firing came on the heels of the insurrection by a group of MNLF officials called the Council of 15, which “retired” him as chairman of the MNLF.

The council’s leaders argued that Misauri’s ouster was meant to preserve the supposed gains of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the front and the government. Misuari, stung and bitter, called it a betrayal and a product of Malacanang’s manipulation of the council members, who have axes – both personal and political – to grind against him.

Misuari singled out Norberto Gonzales, Arroyo’s adviser on “special concerns” and the leader of Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalita ng Pilipinas (PDSP), a political party dominated by the Jesuits and identified with the camp of former President Fidel Ramos. It was Gonzales who actively organized and supported the council’s “betrayal” of Misuari. Gonzales’s reason for taking part in the coup is not yet fully known, although he told this writer two weeks ago that they only wanted to get Misuari out of the way so Mindanao’s development can go full swing. Nonetheless, Misuari rued the fact that the PDSP is now expanding in Muslim Mindanao, appointing as chairmen in provincial chapters people who are also with the MNLF. There are some critics who are convinced that this is part of President Arroyo’s consolidation of forces in preparation for the 2004 elections. The reasoning is that, since Mindanao had been an Estrada country, the administration needs to establish a good enough machinery early on to counter the opposition’s candidate in the next presidential election.

Misuari’s critics and enemies are convinced that he is the one singular hindrance to the development of Mindanao. “Anything he touches turns to failure,” said Parouk Hussin, a member of the Council of 15. Even his friends and sympathizers are convinced that Misuari is an incompetent leader who didn’t have the managerial and administrative skills to run the autonomous region and the SPCPD. But they are likewise convinced that the government is at fault, mainly because the SPCPD structure is faulty and that autonomy in the ARMM has been a farce, to say the least. Misuari may be incompetent, they said, but he didn’t deserve this kind of treatment.

Misuari is understandably upset. He could not see how the government can promote peace in Mindanao without him. “Can they solve the problem without Misuari and company?” he said last month. After his firing from the SPCPD, he sought sanctuary in Jolo and refused to talk to the media.

The following excerpts were taken from the author’s interview with him in Zamboanga City on his first day outside of Jolo.

You spent three weeks in Jolo since that tumultuous week…

It was providential that I was present in Jolo. Before I went there, there was bad news. When I arrived, two young men had just been “salvaged” and thrown under an acacia tree. It was a sign that Jolo was on the verge of anarchy, when life had become something without value at all.

Was it a portent of things to come?

It could have been. At that time, I thought government was preparing for war because just one day before that fateful referendum, the officers manning the (Army) brigade sent some junior officers to talk to me, to tell me that I should not be alarmed by the posture being taken by the AFP at that time because they said government forces were not going to attack the MNLF. I told them that, before I came here, there were lots of talk regarding plans to disarm the MNLF, in our Kilometer 4 headquarters, the nerve center of our revolutionary authority.

I told them that it seems to me there is something queer about the (troop) movement. I said it occurs to us as though the government forces on the island are gearing for war. In broad daylight that morning, they brought three 105 Howitzers to the top of the mountain in Kilometer 4, in Buod Datu. They moved and dismantled their camps in Ipil and concentrated their forces (in Kilometer 4) and this was done in broad daylight, in the eyes of my people. So it heightened the tension.

I told them I’m afraid that civilians and the MNLF might misunderstand, might misinterpret the movement of troops, even if what they were saying was true that they were not preparing for an attack. What aggravated this was, after they left, at 1:30 in the morning, the commanders or the rangers were trying to climb up the wall that separates us from the brigade. They were doing may be some exercise but they were carrying their arms, in full battle gear.